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LEGAL FACETS OF THE INCOME TAX
RATE LIMITATION PROGRAM
Frank E. Packard*
T RE iDEA of placing a constitutional ceiling upon the power
of a government to tax is neither new nor revolutionary.
Seventeen precedents exist within the United States for limita-
tions of that character as seventeen state constitutions make
specific provision on the point. These self-imposed limitations are
set forth as annual maxima and take one of three forms, to-wit:
(1) a stipulated number of mills per dollar of assessed valuation
of all taxable property within the state,' (2) a designated number
of cents, 2 or a percentage of the assessed valuation,8 beyond which
the taxing authorities may not go. In terms of date of adoption,
these provisions run back to as early as 1864, in the case of
Nevada, but one, in the case of Georgia, is as recent as 1945.
They cannot, then, be written off as being typical of, or essentially
related to, the Granger Movement of the late Nineteenth Century.
It is true, however, that the states concerned, with the exception
of Michigan, lie west of the Mississippi River or are to be
found in the South, for a constitutional ceiling on the power of
a state government to tax has not been utilized by Eastern or
New England states, nor by those states bordering on the Pacific.
While the cost of state government has been rising with the years,
* LL.D. Hamline University. Member of the Bar, State of Illinois and United
States Supreme Court. Senior partner, Packard and Evans, Chicago.
1 Eleven state constitutions fit this category with limits varying from two mills
to fifty mills: S. D. Const. 1889, Art. 11, § 1, two mills; Utah Const. 1896, Art. 13,
§ 7, two and four-tenths mills; Okla. Const. 1907, Art. 10, § 9, three and one-half
mills; Colo. Const. 1876, Art. 10, § 11, four mills; N. Mex. Const. 1911, Art. 8, § 2,
four mills; N. D. Const. 1889, Art. 11, § 174, four mills; Wyo. Const. 1890, Art. 15,
§ 4, four mills; Ga. Const. 1945, Art. 7, § 1(2), five mills; La. Const. 1921, Art. 10,
§ 3, five and one-quarter mills; Ida. Const. 1890, Art. 7, § 9, ten mills; Nev. Const.
1864, Art. 10, § 145.01, fifty mills.
2 Three states have limitations of this kind with variation ranging from twenty
to one hundred cents: Mo. Const. 1875, Art. 10, § 8, twenty cents; Tex. Const. 1876,
Art. 8, § 9, thirty-five cents; W. Va. Const. 1872, Art. 10, § 1, one hundred cents.
3 In this category are the constitutional provisions of three states, to-wit: Ala.
Const. 1901, Art. 11, § 214, sixty-five one-hundredths of one per cent; Ark. Const.
1874, Art. 16, § 8, one per cent; Mich. Const. 1908, Art. 10, § 21, one and one-half per
cent.
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the impact of the burden thereof has been distributed through
the use of such newly developed methods as sales, use, or similar
indirect-forms of state taxation to the point where there has been
little agitation for an extension of the concept of constitutional
tax limitation to other states.
In the field of the federal government, however, the story is
quite different. There, governmental reliance on income taxa-
tion as a prime source of revenue, with a steady and persistent
demand for higher and yet higher income tax rates, has generated
pressure for the adoption of an amendment to the United States
Constitution placing a twenty-five per cent ceiling on the federal
power to levy income taxes.4 Without comment on the point that
much of the claimed need for federal revenue would be abated if
state governments would refrain from looking to Washington for
subsidization, it is proposed to consider here some of the legal
facets related to this demand for constitutional revision.
Beginning in 1939, a movement to secure an appropriate con-
stitutional amendment designed to limit income tax rates, at least
in peace time, has spread widely. As it would be unrealistic to
expect Congress to initiate the step, the method generally pursued
has been one looking toward state action memorializing Congress
to call a convention for the purpose of considering such an amend-
ment.5 That method has not heretofore been utilized as a per-
missible manner for securing constitutional revision as all of the
existing amendments originated with Congress and were sub-
mitted by it to state legislatures or to state conventions for the
purpose of securing the necessary popular approval. Resolutions
in favor of a rate-ceiling amendment, asking Congress to call
a convention, have been passed by twenty-six of the state legis-
latures in the period between 1939 and the present time,6 and it is
4 Prior to the adoption of the XVI Amendment, the federal revenue was princi-
pally derived from duties and excise taxes imposed pursuant to U. S. Const., Art. I,
§ 8.
5 U. S. Const., Art. V.
6 States which have acted include Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
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anticipated that similar resolutions will be submitted in at least
seven more state legislatures in session this year.7 If six more
states join the list, the essential two-thirds rule would have been
fully observed but for the fact that four of the states which
originally voted favorably have since taken action to rescind
their respective resolutions," Illinois being among them, and
have thereby revived the question as to the operative effect of a
retraction by a state legislature after a favorable vote has once
been given on an issue of constitutional amendment.
There would appear to be sufficient precedent, growing up
under prior amendments, to indicate that the purported retraction
should fail in purpose so that, with six more states added to the
list, Congress should be empowered to act upon this growing
demand for constitutional limitation on income tax rates. In the
case of the Fourteenth Amendment, for example, the New Jersey
and Ohio legislatures were originally among those state legis-
latures which voted approval.9 They subsequently took action to
rescind their respective ratifications,' 0 but Congress, upon receipt
of advice of the passage of ratifications by the necessary three-
fourths of the states, adopted a resolution which listed the ratifying
states, including New Jersey and Ohio, 1 and transmitted that
resolution to the Department of State. The then Secretary of
State, William H. Seward, pursuant to such resolution and acting
under statutory duty, thereupon issued his certification declaring
the Fourteenth Amendment to be an integral part of the federal
constitution. 12  He, too, listed the ratifying states and included
New Jersey and Ohio in that category.
In much the same way, when the Fifteenth Amendment was
proposed, the state legislature of New York originally voted in
7 The seven states are Arizona, California, Colorado, Maryland, New York, South
Carolina and Virginia.
8 See Ala. Acts 1945, p. 155; Ill. Laws 1945, p. 1797; Ky. Acts 1946, p. 720; Wis.
Laws 1944-5, pp. 1126-7.
9 See, for example, Ohio Laws 1867, pp. 320-1.
10 The proclamation of the Secretary of State mentions the purported action taken
and notes it to be "a matter of doubt and uncertainty whether such resolutions are
not irregular, invalid, and therefore ineffectual." 15 U. S. Stat. at L. 707.
11 15 U. S. Stat. at L. 706-7.
12 Ibid., p. 707.
INCOME TAX LIMITATION PROGRAM
favor of it but later took action to rescind the original deter-
mination. 3  Again, after ratification had been obtained by the
requisite three-fourths of the states, Hamilton Fish, in his capac-
ity as Secretary of State issued his certificate that the amend-
ment had been adopted and, in the list of supporting states, he
included New York.
14
Ratification by state legislatures has been directed by Con-
gress in the case of all but one of the twenty-two amendments to
the United States Constitution. In the case of the Twenty-first
Amendment, designed to repeal the ill-fated liquor prohibition of
the Eighteenth Amendment, Congress did direct that ratification
thereof be made through state conventions. This exception to
the general policy historically followed was made seemingly ex
industria. As speed was not facilitated thereby, the only feasible
reason for this exception may be said to rest in the fact that the
Twenty-first was the only one proposed which was designed to
repeal a prior constitutional amendment. It is possible that
Congress may have thought it would be incongruous for state
legislatures, in order to ratify the proposed Twenty-first Amend-
ment, to take a step which would, in effect, rescind the prior
action which they had taken constituting the approval of the
Eighteenth Amendment. Actually, of course, the proposal was
treated as a new matter but, in essence, it was a repeal, or a
rescission, of earlier action. To avoid any question, the issue was
submitted to agencies closer to the seat of sovereignty, that is to
the peoples of the several states acting through popularly chosen
conventions. By so doing, precedent opposed to legislative retrac-
tion of an earlier favorable vote on a constitutional question was
left undisturbed. There would, then, be reason to believe that all
states which have acted favorably on the proposed income tax
limitation, regardless of later retraction, should be counted for
purpose of securing the necessary quorum.
The second issue which may require consideration is one as
18 16 U. S. Stat. at L. 1131-2 recites: ".. . it appears from an official document on
Me in this Department that the... State of New York has since passed resolutions
claiming to withdraw the said ratification. Italics added.
14 16 U. S. Stat. at L. 1131-2.
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to whether or not, because certain of these state resolutions
were passed over ten years ago, it could be said that they have
become devitalized by lapse of more than a reasonable period of
time, thereby requiring the elimination of such states as Wyoming,
Mississippi and Rhode Island from the present count with the
possible addition of others as time passes. The Wyoming reso-
lution, first in the field, was adopted over twelve years ago, 15
while those of Mississippi and Rhode Island date back to 1940.16
Persons opposed to the movement to secure the adoption of an
income tax rate limitation amendment might base their opposi-
tion, at least in part, on the holding in the case of Dillon v. Gloss.'7
It was there decided (1) that Article V of the United States
Constitution impliedly requires that a submitted amendment be
ratified within a reasonable period of time after proposal; (2)
that Congress may, at the time of submission, fix a reasonable
time for ratification; and (3) that a fixed period of seven years
would be considered as reasonable for this purpose.
The fallacy of the objection, if made, would appear evident
from a reading of the statement made by Mr. Justice Van De-
vanter, speaking on behalf of a unanimous court, in the Dillon
case. He said: " . proposal and ratification are not
treated as unrelated acts but as succeeding steps in a single en-
deavor, the natural inference being that they are not to be widely
separated in time."'s The time interval which must not be
unreasonable is the interval between proposal and ratification
of an amendment. The doctrine of the case has no application
to, nor could it support any argument in opposition to, the several
resolutions calling for a constitutional convention. There is
nothing in either constitutional provision or decision making the
reasonable time period pertinent to those steps which precede the
formulation and submission of a proposed amendment. There is,
as yet, no proposed amendment nor will there be one until Con-
15 Wyo. Laws 1939, p. 259, H. J. M. 6.
16 Miss. Gen. Laws 1940, p. 602, S. R. 14; Rhode Island Acts 1940, pp. 744-6,
S. R. 80.
17256 U. S. 368, 41 S. Ct. 510, 65 L. Ed. 994 (1921).
18 256 U. S. 368 at 374-5, 41 S. Ct. 510, 65 L. Ed. 994 at 997.
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gress calls a convention, that convention proposes an amendment
or amendments, and Congress directs the mode of ratification.
Until then, no issue regarding the reasonableness of the time inter-
val between the initiatory steps taken by one state and the reach-
ing of a climax by the passage of the necessary thirty-second
resolution could arise.
No greater strength is provided with respect to this objection
by anything said or done in the case of Coleman v. Miller.19 True
it is that Mr. Justice Butler, with Mr. Justice McReynolds con-
curring, there dissented on the point as to whether the Kansas
legislature had delayed its ratification of the Child Labor amend-
ment beyond a reasonable period of time. It was his belief that
a thirteen-year interval between proposal and ratification con-
stituted an unreasonable length of time. Aside from the fact
that his views appear in a dissenting opinion, hence possess little
beyond persuasive effect, it may be noted that, as in the Dillon
case, the stress is on the time period between submission of a
proposed amendment and its ratification, not one relating to the
initiatory steps.
Assuming that no state action already taken is ineffective for
the purpose, whether by reason of ineffectual attempt at retrac-
tion or by the long passage of time, the next problem would seem
to be one as to the character to be given to the several state reso-
lutions after a quorum has been reached. If they are but direc-
tory in character, Congress could still prevent action on the pro-
posed income tax rate limitation by tabling the matter in much the
same way it did, years ago, with regard to the many memorials,
resolutions, and petitions presented to it relating to slavery. If,
on the other hand, the summons is of mandatory character, Con-
gress would have no alternative in the matter. It would either
have to pass enabling legislation calling the convention into
session or be guilty of a clear violation of its constitutional duty.
In that connection, the language of the Constitution itself be-
comes important. Article V thereof, providing for its amend-
ment, directs that "The Congress . . . on the application of
19 307 U. S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972, 83 L. Ed. 1385, 122 A. L. R. 695 (1939).
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the legislatures of two-thirds of the several states, shall call a
convention proposing amendments."2° In the light thereof, it is
not surprising that all writers on the subject are in agreement
on the point that, when a sufficient demand is made, it is manda-
tory upon Congress to call a convention. Professor Rottschaefer,
for example, has said that amendments". . . may be proposed
by Congress on its own initiative whenever two-thirds of both
houses shall deem it necessary, or by a convention called for that
purpose which Congress is required to call on application of the
legislatures of two-thirds of the states." 21 "It would appear,"
wrote Professor Willoughbv "that the act thus required of Con-
gress is a purely ministerial one in substance, if not in form, and
the obligation to perform it is stated in imperative form by the
Constitution." 22 Mr. Justice Story, as long ago as 1816, pointed
out, through the medium of the decision in Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee,23 that the word "shall" as used in the Constitution im-
ports the imperative and the mandatory. There can, then, be
little doubt on the score as to the action Congress should take
upon receipt by it of a sufficient number of state resolutions deal-
ing with the income tax proposal.
The question then could become one as to what action could
be taken if Congress, despite the sufficiency of the memorialization,
should either fail or refuse to call a convention for the proposing
of amendments and the pressure of public opinion should prove
ineffective to prod it into action. It is not expected that Con-
gress would attempt to defeat the will of more than a majority
of the states, but if it did clear legal remedy exists to deal with
that eventuality. That remedy could take the form of a writ
of mandamus directed to each individual member of Congress.
It would not be necessary to search very far for precedent. Two
cases will serve to illustrate what might be accomplished through
the use of that form of proceeding. In State v. Town Council of
20 U. S. Const., Art. V. Italics added.
21 Rottschaefer, Handbook of American Constitutional Law (West Publishing Co.,
St. Paul, 1939), p. 388. Italics added.
22 Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States (Baker, Voorhis &
Co., New York, 1929), Vol. 1, p. 597. Italics added.
23 14 U. S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 4 L. Ed. 97 (1816).
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South Kingston,24 for example, the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island issued such a writ against a municipal quasi-legislative
body, pointing to the fact that the case was a proper one for
judicial consideration. It there said:
One office of mandamus is to enforce obedience to statute
law. In general, it lies. to compel all officers to perform
ministerial duties, as well as to compel subordinate courts
to perform judicial duties; but not to compel the exercise of
discretion in any particular way. It is not contended that the
duty of the town council in this matter is other than minis-
terial. Mandamus is peculiarly the proper remedy when
other specific remedies are wanting. The remedy which a
legislature can provide is to make a law applicable to the
case. When the law is made, it is for the court to enforce it,
or to punish for disobedience of it. In either function, it
must construe the statute, i. e., declare what it means. In
the present case, if the law already made imposes a present
duty, no further legislation would make it more imperative.
Any legislative act designed as a remedy must impose minis-
terial duties upon individuals. The court must again be re-
sorted to, to compel such individuals to perform those duties.
So that in the last analysis this remedy by mandamus is the
only specific and efficient one, and if it is not afforded there
are no other means which can give to the electors the oppor-
tunity to exercise such rights as the law gives them.
25
In the other, that of Virginia v. West Virginia,26 the United
States Supreme Court itself issued such a writ against a state
legislature. It answered a challenge thereto by saying:
The remedy sought, as we have at the outset seen, is an
order in the nature of mandamus commanding the levy by
the legislature of West Virginia of a tax to pay the judgment.
Insofar as the duty to award that remedy is disputed merely
24 18 R. I. 258, 27 A. 599, 22 L. R. A. 65 (1893).
25 18 R. I. 258 at 265, 27 A. 599 at 602.
26246 U. S. 565, 38 S. Ct. 400, 62 L. Ed. 883 (1918).
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because authority to enforce a judgment against a State may
not affect state power, the contention is adversely disposed
of by what we have said.
27
There is no likelihood, therefore, that the remedy would prove
inadequate for the congressional duty, in relation to calling a
convention for the purpose of considering amendments to the
constitution, is clearly ministerial in character and would require
no exercise of discretion which would militate against the use of
mandamus.
28
Naturally, such a proceeding would have to be brought by
some one acting as relator and would have to be instituted in an
appropriate court. Although the United States Supreme Court
itself issued the writ in the West Virginia case aforementioned,
it did so because recourse had been had to its original jurisdiction
over suits wherein two or more of the United States appear as
parties. 29 Not being vested with original jurisdiction over man-
damus proceedings as such, but merely empowered to use that
remedy as a necessary incident to a jurisdiction already acquired,
it would obviously be improper to institute the action in the
United States Supreme Court. In fact, since Marbury v. Madi-
son,30 any attempt to provide that court with original jurisdiction
over mandamus, short of a constitutional amendment so provid-
ing, would be ineffective. There is no question, however, since
the holding in Kendall v. United States,3 1 that federal district
courts, including the courts of the District of Columbia, are em-
powered to act in such matters and choice of a tribunal in the
last mentioned area would seem preferable so as to facilitate the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of members of Con-
gress. An appeal from a decision of such a court could, if neces-
sary, be taken to the Supreme Court of the United States.
27 246 U. S. 565 at 603-4, 38 S. Ct. 400, 62 L. Ed. 883 at 891.
28 That mandamus will not lie against the members of a state legislature to
compel performance of a duty requiring the exercise of discretion, see Fergus v.
Marks, 321 Ill. 10, 152 N. E. 557, 46 A. L. R. 960 (1926).
29 U. S. Const., Art. III, § 2.
80 5 U. S. (1 Cranch) 368, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
3137 U. S. (12 Pet.) 524, 9 L. Ed. 1181 (1838).
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As to the designation of a relator, Mr. Walter K. Tuller,
writing in the North American Review, has indicated that it is
believed that
such a proceeding may be instituted by any citizen. Every
citizen of the country has a direct interest that the Constitu-
tion shall be obeyed, and that interest is none the less real
and entitled to recognition and protection by the courts that
it is not capable of financial computation. Indeed, the very
fact that he has no other remedy serves rather, under the
established principles governing its issuance, to emphasize
his right to this writ.
2
Whether the writ would be obeyed, or whether the claim might
be advanced that one department of the federal government is
powerless to assert its authority over another and co-ordinate
branch of the same government, are questions which could not be
answered at this time and may, for that matter, never arise. As
Mr. Tuller states, every officer, of whatever branch, is sworn to
support and obey the Constitution, and it is "the natural pre-
sumption, fully justified by our history, that none will refuse to
obey its mandates as interpreted by that body whose function
and duty it is to do so."
This analysis has been pursued with an additional thought in
mind. At the moment, less than thirty-two states have adopted
resolutions calling for a convention to consider a specific proposal
relating to a constitutional amendment prescribing limitations on
the power of the federal government to levy income taxes. Enough
state legislatures have, from time to time, passed resolutions
pertaining to other subject matters, however, so that, if these
states could be added to the twenty-six expressly favoring the
income tax proposal, the necessary quorum would have already
been reached and could form the basis for immediate action.
Long prior to the action of the Wyoming legislature on the in-
come tax question, thirty-six state legislatures had passed resolu-
32 Tuller, "A Convention to Amend the Constitution-Why Needed-How It May
Be Obtained," 11 No. Amer. Rev. 369, particularly 382-3 (1911).
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tions at varying times memorializing Congress to call a conven-
tion. A list of the states involved was submitted to the Senate,
in 1930, by Senator Tydings of Maryland during the second
session of the Seventy-first Congress.3 His compilation was
recognized as authoritative by a bar association committee
which had been charged with the duty of looking into and report-
ing on general proposals relating to amendments to the fed-
eral constitution.
3 4
Nine of the states so listed had passed resolutions dealing
exclusively with the subject of, or advocating the direct election
of, United States senators,3 5 so it might be regarded that these
resolutions had been negated by the adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment. Congress itself removed the necessity for popular
action on that point through conventions by responding to the
prevailing sentiment with its own proposal which was speedily
ratified and proclaimed in 1913. It would appear to be no more
than logical that these nine states, except as they may have
specifically acted on the income tax question, should not be counted
for quorum purposes. But all told, during the height of the
senatorial discussion, some twenty-six states adopted resolutions
and most of these were quite general in scope although they may
have been framed with the same thought in mind.
Some writers have expressed a belief that all these calls have
been rendered sterile. For example, Professor Orfield wrote:
"In 1901 several legislatures petitioned for a convention to con-
sider an amendment for the popular election of Senators, and by
1909 twenty-six states had petitioned for that purpose. The
adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment would perhaps destroy
the effect of these petitions. ' ' 36 The aforementioned bar associa-
tion committee also indicated that it was "of the opinion that as
the purpose in filing the petitions . . . was satisfied
33 Sen. Doe. 78, 71st Cong., 2d Sess.
34 74 Cong. Rec. 2924-5 (1931) ; 17 A. B. A. J. 143 (1931).
35 The nine are illustrated by Ark. Laws 1903, p. 483; Cal. Stats. 1903, p. 682;
Ky. Acts 1902, p. 394; Me. Laws 1911; Minn. Laws 1901, p. 676; N. J. Laws 1907,
p. 736; Pa. Laws 1901, p. 860; Utah Laws 1903, p. 204; and Wyo. Laws 1895, p. 298.
36 Orfield, The Amending of the Federal Constitution (University of Michigan
Press, Ann Arbor, 1942), pp. 42-3.
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they have become ineffective." It did add that if this conclusion
was "doubtful concerning petitions requesting a convention for
general purposes," still it was sufficient to say, at that time, that
the deduction of the number relating exclusively to the popular
election of senators would "result in reducing the remaining
number substantially below that required for the needed two-
thirds.' '37
A simple mathematical calculation will reveal, provided all
of these resolutions are not invalidated, that the quorum point
has been reached prior to this time. Thus, if the nine resolutions
relating to the popular election of senators be deducted from
the thirty-six mentioned in the Tydings report and the product
thereof be added to the twenty-six dealing with the subject of an
income tax limitation, the net result would be a total of fifty-three.
But, of course, several of the thirty-six states which have passed
diverse types of resolutions prior to 1939 are included in the list
of twenty-six which have taken specific action on the income tax
question. To be exact, thirteen states fall into this category of
duplicate action.38 If these, in turn be deducted, there would still
remain forty states, or eight more than the thirty-two required
by Article V of the Constitution, to make it imperative and man-
datory upon Congress to call a convention at this time. Such a
convention could have for its purpose the considering and pro-
posing of amendments at least on the tax question, if not on any
or every possible point, for every general call would logically
include, within itself, the lesser and specific topic of tax limita-
tion.
The question which arises at this point is whether it would be
proper to count outstanding resolutions which pertain to differ-
ent subject matters together for the purpose of securing the nec-
essary number of states or whether only those resolutions limited
exclusively to the same topic may be counted. What little au-
thority there is on the subject would approve the first of these
views. Professor Orfield has written to the effect that no prob-
37 17 A. B. A. J. 143 at 145.
38 The thirteen are Alabama, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Texas, and Wisconsin.
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lem exists if two-thirds of the state legislatures asked for a con-
vention for the purpose of general revision or for revision in the
same particular. It is, he notes, when "one legislature desires a
convention for one purpose, as to prohibit polygamy, another
legislature for another purpose, as to adopt the initiative and
referendum, and a third legislature for a general purpose" that
some doubt would arise whether the prerequisite for a call has
been met. He indicated that the "better view would seem to be
that the ground of the application would be immaterial, and that
a demand by two-thirds of the states would conclusively show a
widespread desire for constitutional changes." '39  In much the
same vein is the comment of Wayne B. Wheeler who expressed
the opinion that where "thirty-two state legislatures made ap-
plication for a convention, each requesting a different amend-
ment" the result might be considered "sufficient to call a conven-
tion on the ground that they conclusively showed a wide-spread
demand for changes in government. ''14 Is there not occasion,
then, to believe that Congress should act without further delay?
No attempt has here been made to evaluate the merit or wis-
dom of the proposed limitation on income tax rates, other than to
note that if such a proposal was submitted and ratified it would,
without question, become binding on the federal government, the
powers of which are no more than delegated ones. It, unlike the
truly sovereign state, lacks an unfettered power to tax and may
derive its revenue only from those sources and in the manner
prescribed by the constitution.41 The argument will, therefore,
probably be raised that any limitation of the type which has been
proposed would render the federal government powerless to pro-
tect the nation and lead to a return of the days of the Articles of
Confederation.
Those who would offer that argumnent should note that each
resolution specifies that the proposed limitation on income tax
39 Orfield, op. cit. note 36, p. 42.
40 Wheeler, "Is a Constitutional Convention Impending?" 21 Ill. L. Rev. 782,
particularly p. 795 (1927).
41 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 15 S. Ct. 673, 39 L. Ed. 759
(1895).
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rates should be subject to the qualification that, "in the event
of a war in which the United States is engaged creating a grave
national emergency requiring such action to avoid national dis-
aster," the tax limitation may be deferred. If the sub-argument
should be made that it would require a "war" to produce a de-
ferment in the tax limitation program and that a "police action"
would not be sufficient, the simple answer is that the phraseology
is broad enough to include the so-called "police action." As a
federal judge once phrased the point, "a formal declaration of
war is not necessary before it can be said that a condition of
war exists." '42  The proposed limitation, therefore, appears to
have been carefully written and the people, through a convention
called for the purpose, should be given a prompt opportunity to
pass upon the suggestion. 43
42 Johnsen, J., in Verano v. DeAngelis Coal Co., 41 F. Supp. 954 (1941), at p. 955.
43 A proposed joint resolution has been submitted to Congress. It was referred to
the House Committee on Judiciary on September 13, 1951, but no other action has,
as yet, been taken thereon.
